ABSTRACT Complex networks in real world inevitably suffer from diverse kinds of attacks. Due to the external attacks, some components of a network will be destroyed and therefore will lose their functions. In reality, the components of a network normally interact with one another. As a consequence, the dysfunction of some components is likely to cause the dysfunction of components that rely on the failed components. As the newly failed components may continue to cause the dysfunction of other network components, a system-level cascading dysfunction eventually could happen which can lead to the breakdown of the original network. It is therefore of great significance to assess the robustness of complex networks under attacks. In the literature, many network models and theories have been developed to study the robustness of complex networks. However, the majority of existing studies only investigate multilayer networks, while very little attention is paid to two-mode networks. Two-mode networks are an import ingredient of network sciences. Nevertheless, the structures of two-mode networks are different from that of multilayer networks. As a consequence, theories developed for multilayer networks cannot be applied to two-mode networks. With regard to this, in this paper we put forward a theoretical method to assess the robustness of twomode networks under node attacks. By taking into account the special structures of two-mode networks as well as making use of probability theory, we therefore put forward the corresponding theory for calculating the robustness of two-mode networks to node failures. In order to verify the correctness of the proposed theory, we carry out simulations on computer-generated two-mode networks with compound Poisson degree distributions. The simulation results are in accordance with what are obtained from our developed theory. The simulation results have validated the correctness of our proposed method for robustness assessment of two-mode networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Our daily lives heavily rely on diverse kinds of complex systems [1] - [3] . To cite some examples, we rely on systems like transportation [4] , mobile communication systems [5] , power grid systems [6] , etc. All these systems contribute a lot the the modernisation of our lives [7] . It is universally acknowledged that complex systems which underpin our lives can suffer from random system failures in reality [4] , [8] . Moreover, apart from random system failures real-world systems also can suffer from intentional attacks [9] - [11] . For example, computer systems could occasionally suffer from the attacks The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Jianxiang Xi. of virus. A system can fail to provide services to our lives if it is under perturbations. Therefore, it is important to ensure the stability of complex systems under perturbations [12] , [13] .
In order to ensure the stability of complex systems, it then would be helpful to find a way to assess the stability of complex systems. In the literature, researchers have made great efforts towards the stability assessment of complex systems [14] - [16] . Among all the existing methods for the stability assessment of complex systems, one effective method is based on network modelling and analysis [17] . A network in the literature is generally modelled by a graph and a graph contains a set of nodes and edges [18] - [21] . The assumption of network modelling for complex systems is that the nodes of a graph represent the components of a complex system, while the edges represent the relationships between different network components. Network modelling and analysis for complex systems have been proved to be effective and have been applied to solve a wide variety of problems, including the stability assessment of complex systems [22] .
In the last decade, a lot of valuable works have been done to assess the stabilities of complex systems by making use of network modelling [1] , [16] , [23] . The main idea for assessing the stabilities of complex systems from the perspective of complex networks is to first model a system as a network and then apply network theories to quantify the ability of the network to perturbations. Amongst existing network theories for quantifying the ability of the network to perturbations, one widely studied theory is network robustness [24] , [25] . There are numerous works on studying network robustness [26] - [29] . Before 2010, researchers mainly studied the robustness of single networks [30] . Related studies have discovered that single networks are robust to perturbations. With the development of science and technology as well as the ever-increasing demand of human beings, complex systems in reality are becoming more and more complicated. An emergent phenomenon came out and attracted the attention of both industry and academy, which is that complex systems in reality normally have to interact with one another so as to accomplish complex tasks [31] . In order to capture the stability nature of complex systems with interdependencies, scientists suggest the multilayer network modelling [32] - [34] . Ever since the work published in [35] , studies on the robustness of multilayer networks now have become the leading topic for network robustness analysis [23] , [36] , [37] . Tremendous works have been done towards the robustness analysis of multilayer networks [32] . Multilayer networks have been discovered to be fragile to perturbations [38] .
The mainstream of current research on network robustness is about multilayer networks. A lot of network theories and models have been accordingly proposed [29] , [35] , [39] . Note that in reality there is a body of special complex systems each of which contains two different entities. To cite some examples, the recommenders systems which contain the users and the commodities; the control systems which contain the controllers and objects; the antagonistic ecosystems which contain the predators and preys; etc. These kind of systems in reality also can suffer from perturbations. For example, a recommender system can suffer from the lost of users, which can cause great economical losses; a control system can suffer from attacks and the control task could fail; an antagonistic ecosystem can suffer from poaching and certain species may become endangered. Therefore, it is important to investigate the robustness of these kinds of complex systems. Due to the special structure of these systems, scientists normally model these systems as two-mode networks [22] , [40] . Literally, one mode (or one node set) of a two-mode network represents one of the two entities of the system mentioned above. To study the robustness of two-mode networks is of both theoretical and practical values.
Existing theories for investigating network robustness can be roughly grouped into two classes, i.e., the class of theories that are developed for one-mode networks [7] , [30] , [40] , and the class of theories that are developed for multilayer networks [29] , [35] , [39] . For an one-mode network, namely a single homogeneous network, all the nodes follow the same degree distribution. As mentioned earlier, a two-mode network has two node sets. Therefore, the degree distribution of the nodes in each node set does not need to follow the same distribution. As a consequence, existing theories like those provided in [7] , [30] , [40] for analysing the robustness of one-mode networks cannot be applied to two-mode networks. Theories developed for multilayer networks seem to be promising for two-mode networks as the structure of a two-mode network is very similar to that of a two-layer network. Note that each layer of a two-layer network is a unique network. When investigating the robustness of multilayer networks, one has to model the cascading effect on the networks. For a two-mode network, each mode of nodes cannot constitute a network and cascading failures are not likely to happen. Therefore, the theories developed in [29] , [35] , [39] do not work for two-mode networks. With regard to these facts, in this work we put forward a mathematical method to calculate the robustness of two-mode networks. Our proposed method is based on probability theory and the mutual connected giant component concept. For a given two-mode network with known degree distributions, when a fraction of nodes are removed from the network based on an introduced node attack model, the proposed method can figure out the fraction of nodes that are in the mutual connected giant component, whereby quantifying the robustness of the given network.
To validate the effectiveness of the proposed method, experiments on computer-generated two-mode networks are done. The experiments comply well with the proposed theory, which indicates that the proposed theory is effective for assessing the robustness of two-mode networks to node attacks. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the section to come, we provide the related backgrounds that are necessary for the understanding of this work. Afterward, we give the definition to the investigated problem of this work. Then we provide in detail the proposed mathematical method for robustness assessment of two-mode networks. At last, we do the simulations to validate the effectiveness of our proposed method and conclude the paper.
II. RELATED BACKGROUNDS A. NETWORK NOTATIONS
The most widely used method to describe a complex network is using a graph. Mathematically, a graph is denoted by G = {V , E}. The symbol V is a node set. Each node v i ∈ V represents a component of the original complex network under studied. The symbol E is an edge set. Each edge e ij ∈ E represents the relationship between its two endpoints, i.e., nodes v i and v j . Normally, we respectively use VOLUME 7, 2019 n = |V | and m = |E| to denote the number of nodes and edges in G.
In order to better capture the relationships between the components of a complex network, researchers have came out with the adjacency matrix metric. The adjacency matrix of a network/graph G is generally denoted by A n×n . The element of A, i.e., a ij , is calculated as a ij = 1, if there exists a relationship between nodes v i and v j ; otherwise, a ij = 0. Apparently, we have a ii = 0. Normally, we define k i = n j=1 a ij as the degree of node v i . Physically, the degree k i of node v i denotes the number of nodes that have connections with v i .
One may realize that the adjacency matrix A described above is binary and symmetric. However, the adjacency matrix A does not need to be binary. The value of a ij depends on how one quantifies the relationship between nodes v i and v j . Meanwhile, matrix A does not need to be symmetric. The edges of network G can be directed depending on the specific problem one is going to solve.
B. TWO-MODE NETWORKS
In the above subsection we have provided the basic descriptions of complex networks together with the general notations. Here let us consider a special network as defined in what follows.
Definition 1 (Two-Mode Networks): Consider a network G = {V , E}. If G possesses the following properties:
then G is defined as a two-mode network. Remark 1: Let n 1 = |V 1 | and n 2 = |V 2 | respectively be the number of nodes in node sets V 1 and V 2 of a two-mode network G. We define a two-mode adjacency matrix H n 1 ×n 2 with its element h ij = 1 when there is an edge between nodes v i ∈ V 1 and v j ∈ V 2 and h ij = 0, otherwise. Then the adjacency matrix of G can be written as:
with n = n 1 + n 2 being the total number of nodes in G and H T being the transpose of H. Example (Two-Mode Networks): Fig. 1 shows a graphical example of a two-mode network as well as its corresponding adjacency matrix. We can clearly see from Fig. 1 that for a two-mode network there is no edge between nodes that belong to the same node set. researchers have developed many metrics to quantify the capability of a complex network subject to attacks [26] .
Among the existing metrics for network robustness assessment, the most widely used metric is the one based on the network concept of mutually connected giant component [22] , hereafter abbreviated as MCGC. When a network is under attack, then the attack could break the network into different clusters. A MCGC of a given network refers to the cluster that has the largest number of nodes. Based on the MCGC metric, for a given network G = {V , E} with n nodes, the robustness of G in the literature is denoted by P ∞ and it is measured as the ratio of the nodes in the MCGC to n [22] .
Network robustness assessment based on the MCGC metric is widely studied by researchers [24] , [41] . Compared to other metrics studied in [26] for assessing network robustness, the MCGC metric assesses the robustness of a network using the size of the MCGC of the network. Note that the MCGC of a network is the largest part, researchers thus assume that the size of the MCGC can depict the robustness of a network.
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION
The above section has provided the related backgrounds for two-mode networks and network robustness. In this work we aim to analyze the robustness of two-mode networks subject to intentional node attacks. In this section, we first present our introduced node attack strategy. Based on the node attack strategy, we then define our research problem.
A. NODE REMOVE STRATEGY
In order to assess the robustness of a network under attacks, we need to mathematically model the attack scenarios on networks. When a network is under attack, then its nodes and/or edges could be attacked. In the literature, researchers normally investigate the robustness of networks under node attacks, since the studies of the robustness of networks under edge attacks are akin to that of node attack scenarios. Due to this reason, in this paper we study the robustness of two-mode networks to node attacks.
It should be pointed out that networks in reality are likely to suffer from intentional attacks. Meanwhile, the nodes and edges of a complex network in reality also could suffer from random failures. Considering these two factors, in this work we introduce a mathematical model to mimic the scenario that a network is under node attacks. Note that when a network is under node attack, the nodes under attacks may lose their functionalities. From the perspective of complex networks, the nodes that lose their functionalities can be viewed as they have been removed from the network. Based on this consideration, we introduce a node remove strategy which is formulated as follows:
in which k is the degree of a node and variable α is a control parameter. The variable q measures the probability that a node will be removed from a network. When a network suffers from random failures, then each node has the same probability to be attacked. This scenario can be modelled by setting the control parameter α to be 0, since each node gets the same probability q = 1/n to be removed. When a network suffers from intentional attacks, then each node has different probability to be attacked. This scenario can be modelled by setting different values of the control parameter α. For example, if we give a positive value to α, then it mimics the intentional attacks where nodes with larger degrees have higher probabilities to be attacked.
B. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The above mathematical model provides the way on how to model the scenario of networks under node attacks. Based on the above introduced node remove model, we formulate our research problem.
Definition 2 (Robustness of Two-Mode Networks): Define a two-mode network G = {V , E}. Let V 1 and V 2 be its two node sets, and n 1 and n 2 be the number of nodes of its two node sets. For a given value of p i ∈ [0, 1], assume that n i (1 − p i ) nodes are removed from V i for i = 1, 2, and the probability for each node to be removed is calculated using Eq. 3. Then the robustness of a two-mode network is defined as
where MCGC is the largest subnetwork of G in which the n i (1 − p i ) nodes and the edges attached to them are removed from G.
Remark 2:
The above definition states that the probability for each of the removed nodes to be removed is calculated based on Eq. 3. For a two-mode network, the summation in the denominator of Eq. 3 runs from 0 to n 2 if a node in V 2 is in study. Similarly, the summation runs from 0 to n 1 if a node in V 1 is in study.
Remark 3: For a given two-mode network G, when a fraction of nodes are removed from G due to attacks, then G will be divided into many parts, and the MCGC is the largest part that contains the most number of nodes. Since the structures of two-mode networks differ from that of multilayer networks, we are not considering any cascading process on two-mode networks when investigate their robustness.
IV. METHODOLOGY
The above section has explicitly described the research problem, i.e., the robustness of two-mode networks. In this section, we will describe our proposed theory for theoretically calculating the robustness of two-mode networks under intentional node attacks.
A. DEFINITIONS AND RELATED VARIABLES
Before we describe our proposed theory, we first introduce the following definitions which will be frequently used in the later descriptions.
Definition 3 (Degree Distribution P(k)):
The degree distribution P(k) for a given network G is defined as the probability for a node to have a degree of k.
Definition 4 (Excess Degree Distribution P * (k)): The excess degree distribution P * (k) for a given network G is defined as the probability for a node that is reached by following a random chosen edge to have an extra degree of k.
Definition 5 (Generating Function G(x)):
The generating function G(x) for a given degree distribution P(k) is defined as
where x is an arbitrary variable.
Definition 6 (Generating Function G * (x)): The generating function G * (x) for an excess degree distribution P * (k) is defined as
Remark 4: In the literature [35] , [38] , P * (k) is calculated as P * (k) = P(k)(k + 1)/ k , where k denotes the average degree. By substituting P * (k) into the definition of G * (x) we can have
Based on the above definitions, we here list the key variables that will be frequently used in our proposed theory for the robustness assessment of two-mode networks. All the key variables are listed in Table 1 .
B. THEORY FOR ROBUSTNESS CALCULATION UNDER RANDOM ATTACKS
As given in Definition 2, when investigating the robustness of a given two-mode network G, we remove n 1 (1 − p 1 ) nodes from V 1 ⊂ G and n 2 (1 − p 2 ) nodes from V 2 ⊂ G. The probability for each node to be removed is calculated using Eq. 3 which carries the variable α.
Here, we first study the simple case where α = 0. In this case, each node in V 1 has the same probability to be removed, and each node in V 2 also has the same probability to be removed. Because we remove n 1 (1 − p 1 ) nodes from V 1 and n 2 (1 − p 2 ) nodes from V 2 , therefore, each node in V 1 has the same probability of 1 − p 1 to be removed, and each node in V 2 has the same probability of 1 − p 2 to be removed.
The robustness of a two-mode network is defined in Definition 2. It can be seen from Definition 2 that the symbol P ∞ i measures the portion of nodes remained in the MCGC of a two-mode network after node attacks. For a given value of p 1 ∈ [0, 1] and a given value of p 2 ∈ [0, 1] we propose the following theorem to mathematically calculate the robustness of a given two-mode network with known degree distributions.
Theorem 1: Define a two-mode network G with infinite nodes. Let V 1 and V 2 be its two node sets. Let P 1 (k) and P 2 (k) be the degree distributions of nodes in V 1 and V 2 . Given two constants p 1 and p 2 with p 1 , p 2 ∈ [0, 1]. Assume that a fraction of 1 − p 1 of nodes are randomly removed from V 1 , and a fraction of 1 − p 2 of nodes are randomly removed from V 2 . Then the robustness of G can be calculated as
where the two variables x 1 and x 2 are respectively calculated as
Proof: For a given two-mode network, by randomly choosing an edge we can reach two nodes with one belonging to V 1 and the other to V 2 . Let us therefore define two variables x 1 and x 2 . Further, let x 1 be the probability for the randomly chosen edge not to be connected to the MCGC via a node in V 1 . Similarly, let x 2 be the probability for the randomly chosen edge not to be connected to the MCGC via a node in V 2 .
With the definitions of x 1 and x 2 , we next consider the probability that a node belongs to the MCGC of a two-mode network subject to random node attacks.
Because we randomly remove n 1 (1 − p 1 ) nodes from V 1 , therefore each node in V 1 has the same attack probability 1 − p 1 with which it will be removed. According to the definition of a two-mode network we know that a node in V 1 is connected to nodes in V 2 . Based on this fact we know that if a node in V 1 does not belong to the MCGC, then each of its edges should not belong to the MCGC. If each of its edges does not belong to the MCGC, then either the node in V 2 is attacked, which happens with the probability 1 − p 2 , or the node in V 2 does not connect the edge to the MCGC, which happens with the probability p 2 x 2 .
Based on the above analysis we know that, by following a randomly chosen edge we reach a node in V 1 , and the probability y 1 for that node not to belong to the MCGC is then calculated as
Therefore, the probability z for a k-degree node in V 1 not to belong to the MCGC can be calculated by the following binomial process
Based on the above equation, the proportion of nodes in V 1 that also belong to the MCGC can be calculated as
Based on the above analysis, we can prove the expression of P ∞ 2 analogously. In the next we give the proof for the expressions of x 1 and x 2 . We start with x 2 as the above proof is involved with x 2 .
Keep in mind that x 2 denotes the probability that a randomly chosen edge is not with the MCGC by the connection of a node in V 2 . As we know that the node in V 2 only has neighbours in V 1 . Assume that it has k neighbours in V 1 . For those k neighbours, some of them may be attacked and removed, which happens with the probability 1 − p 1 , and the rest of them should not belong to the MCGC in order for the focal edge not to belong to the MCGC.
Based on the above analysis, the probability x 2 can be calculated through the following binomial process
Note that in the above calculation we assume that the node in V 2 that is reached by the randomly chosen edge has k neighbours in V 1 . Putting it another way, the node in V 2 has k excess neighbours in V 1 , and the probability for the node in V 2 to have k excess neighbours in V 1 is P * 1 (k). As a consequence, the final calculation for the probability x 2 is then updated as
Based on the above calculations, we can figure out the expression of x 1 in a similar way.
C. THEORY FOR ROBUSTNESS CALCULATION UNDER INTENTIONAL ATTACKS
The above subsection describes our proposed theory for the case where α = 0, which corresponds to random node attack situations. Here, we investigate the general case where α = 0, which corresponds to the intentional node attacks situations. Before we start describing our proposed general theory, we give the follow Lemma.
Lemma 1: Define a two-mode network G. Let V 1 and V 2 be its two node sets. Let P 1 (k) and P 2 (k) be the degree distributions of nodes in V 1 and V 2 . Given a constant p with p ∈ [0, 1]. Assume that a fraction of 1 − p of nodes are intentionally removed from V 1 using Eq. 3. Then the degree distribution, P 1 (k), of the remaining nodes in V 1 , and the degree distribution, P 2 (k), of the remaining nodes in V 2 , respectively becomes
where
in which φ 1 (p) = 
Now assume that we intentionally remove one more node (removed portion is 1/n 1 ) from V 1 . As a consequence, A , and can be calculated as
Based on the definition of derivative, the above equation can be written as The above equation also could be rewritten as follows dA p 1 1 (k) dp 1 =
By combing Eq. 21 and Eq. 23 we then have p 1 dP 1 (k) dp 1
By solving the above first-order nonlinear differential equation we get the solution as
For the remaining nodes in V 1 , it is easy to figure out the ratio between the number of the remaining edges and that of the original edges as
As a consequence, the degree distribution of the remaining nodes in V 2 can be figured out by using the following binomial process
Based on Lemma 1, we further have the following Lemma. Lemma 2: Define a two-mode network G. Let V 1 and V 2 be its two node sets. Let P 1 (k) and P 2 (k) be the degree distributions of nodes in V 1 and V 2 . Given two constants p 1 and p 2 with p 1 , p 2 ∈ [0, 1]. Assume that a fraction of 1 − p 1 of nodes are intentionally removed from V 1 using Eq. 3, and a fraction of 1 − p 2 of nodes are intentionally removed from V 2 using Eq. 3. Then the degree distribution, P 1 (k), of the remaining nodes in V 1 , and the degree distribution, P 2 (k), of the remaining nodes in V 2 , respectively becomes
with
and
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Proof: The proof of Lemma 2 is analogous to that of Lemma1 and therefore is omitted here. Interested readers can figure out this by themselves.
Based on the above Lemmas, we then come out with our general theory for assessing the robustness of two-mode networks under intentional node attacks.
Theorem 2: Define a two-mode network G with infinite nodes. Let V 1 and V 2 be its two node sets. Let P 1 (k) and P 2 (k) be the degree distributions of nodes in V 1 and V 2 . Given two constants p 1 and p 2 with p 1 , p 2 ∈ [0, 1]. Assume that a fraction of 1 − p 1 of nodes are intentionally removed from V 1 using Eq. 3, and a fraction of 1 − p 2 of nodes are intentionally removed from V 2 using Eq. 3. The degree distribution, P 1 (k), of the remaining nodes in V 1 , and the degree distribution, P 2 (k), of the remaining nodes in V 2 are calculated by using Lemma 2. Then the robustness of G can be calculated as P
and the two variables q 1 , q 2 ∈ [0, 1] satisfy the following relationships
Proof: For a given two-mode network G, assume that we randomly remove a fraction of 1 − q 1 of nodes from V 1 and a fraction of 1 − q 2 of nodes from V 2 . In this case, let us define the degree distributions of the remaining nodes in V 1 and V 2 respectively as P * 1 (k) and P * 2 (k). Analogous to the proof of Lemma 1 we know that P * 1 (k) and P * 2 (k) can be easily calculated as
Putting the above equations into Eqs. 38 and 39 we have
Because P 1 (k) and P 2 (k) are calculated by using Lemma 2, then the above two equations mean that, after intentionally removing a fraction of 1 − p 1 and a fraction of 1 − p 2 of nodes respectively from V 1 and V 2 , the degree distributions of the remaining nodes in V 1 and V 2 are equation to those of the situation where a fraction of 1 − q 1 and a fraction of 1 − q 2 of nodes are randomly removed respectively from V 1 and V 2 . Putting it another way, the remaining part of a given two-mode network subject to intentional node removals of a fraction of 1 − p 1 and a fraction of 1 − p 2 of nodes respectively from V 1 and V 2 has the same degree distributions as the remaining part of the focal two-mode network subject to random node removals of a fraction of 1−q 1 and a fraction of 1 − q 2 of nodes respectively from V 1 and V 2 .
The above conclusion indicates that the robustness calculation of a two-mode network subject to intentional node attacks can be obtained by calculating the robustness of the two-mode network subject to random node attacks.
For a given two-mode network, P 1 (k) and P 2 (k) are calculated by using Lemma 2. Then based on Eqs. 38 and 39 we can figure out q 1 and q 2 . Therefore, we can calculate the robustness of the two-mode network by using Theorem 1.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SIMULATIONS
The above section illustrates in detail the proposed method for mathematically calculating the robustness of a two-mode network subject to intentional node attacks with the node attack strategy given in subsection III-A. In this section, we carry out experiments on computer-generated two-mode networks to check the correctness of the proposed method.
Note that we do not carry out experiments on real-world two-mode networks. The reason is that computer-generated networks have controllable properties like the sizes of networks, the degree distributions of networks, etc., while real-world two-mode networks usually contain noise [42] and therefore their degree distributions may not follow any expected distributions.
A. GENERATING ER TWO-MODE NETWORKS
In the literature, researchers usually generate two kinds of random networks for testing purpose. The first type is the random network whose degree distribution follows the Poisson distribution. In the literature, the first type of networks is called Erdös-Rényi networks, or ER networks for short. The second type is the network whose degree distribution follows the power law distribution. In the literature, the second type of networks is called scale-free networks, or SF networks for short.
Inspired by the way how researchers generate ER networks for testing purpose, in the experiments we generate ER two-mode networks. To be more specific, let V 1 and V 2 be two node sets, and n 1 and n 2 be the number of nodes of the two node sets. For a given probability constant r ∈ [0, 1], for each node in V 1 , we connect the node with each node in V 2 with the probability r. Then the final network is an ER two-mode network.
In the experiments, we generate three class of ER twomode networks. The network properties are summarized in Table 2 .
In each class of the ER two-mode networks we generate four networks. The degree of each network is controlled by the parameter r. 
B. PROPERTIES OF ER TWO-MODE NETWORKS
For an ER two-mode network generated above, we have the following two properties.
Property 1: Given an ER two-mode network G = {V , E} with V 1 and V 2 being its two node sets. Let P 1 (k) and P 2 (k) be the degree distributions of nodes in V 1 and V 2 . Let P(k) be the degree distribution of G. Then in the limit of n 1 , n 2 → ∞, P 1 (k) and P 2 (k) follow the follow Poisson distributions
while P(k) follows the follow distribution
Remark 5: Based on the descriptions of the way for generating the ER two-mode networks we know that, the process is practically a binomial process. As a result, we have Analogously, the expression of P 2 (k) can be obtained in the same way. With P 1 (k) and P 2 (k) at hand, then the calculation for P(k) is quite straightforward and simple.
Property 2: For an ER two-mode network G as generated above, its generating functions have the following properties
Remark 6: Property 1 indicates that both P 1 (k) and P 2 (k) follow the Poisson distributions. By substituting the corresponding degree distributions into the definitions of generating functions we can get
The expressions for G 2 (x) and G * 2 (x) can be achieved in the same way.
C. TESTING ON ER TWO-MODE NETWORKS WITH α = 0
The above subsection provides the properties of ER two-mode networks. By substituting the corresponding properties into the Theorems proposed in Section IV we then can figure out the robustness of a given ER two-mode network with known network size and given edge connection probability variable r. In this subsection, we first validate our proposed theory for the case where an ER two-mode network is under random node attacks.
Figs. 2-4 summarize the results on the three Classes of networks. For each class of networks, when the node attacks happen to V 1 , our proposed theory leads to the following robustness calculation equations
(51) 108324 VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 4. Robustness results on the Class 3 ER two-mode networks. The first, second and third rows show the robustness of the tested Class 3 ER two-mode networks subject to random removal of a fraction 1 − p of nodes respectively from V 1 , V 2 and V (V = V 1 ∪ V 2 ) of the tested ER two-mode networks. Curves are the theoretical results and symbols are the simulations results. In the simulations, p ranges from 0 to 1 with an interval of 0.05.
For each class of networks, when the node attacks happen to V 2 , our proposed theory leads to the following robustness calculation equations
For each class of networks, when the node attacks happen to both V 1 and V 2 , our proposed theory leads to the following robustness calculation equations
In Figs. 2-4 , the simulation results are averaged over 500 independent runs. More specifically, for a given value of p, we have to remove the corresponding portion of nodes from a two-mode network for 500 times so as to make sure that each removed node approximately has the probability as prescribed by Eq. 3 to be removed. We can clearly see from happen to V 2 , P ∞ 2 approximately has a linear correlation with p. This is because of the fact that we remove 1 − p fraction of nodes from V i for i ∈ {1, 2}, and the remaining fraction of nodes in V i approximates p. As removing nodes from V 1 mainly affects the degree distribution of nodes in V 2 but will not lead to major failures of nodes in V 2 , therefore the values of P ∞ 2 are higher than that of P ∞ 1 if the node attacks only happen to V 1 , and vice versa.
The robustness results shown in Figs. 2-4 demonstrate that ER two-mode networks are robust to random node attacks, since the values of critical points of p at which P ∞ i approaches zero are small. The bottom parts of Figs. 2-4 show that, when the node attacks happen to every node set, then twomode networks are relatively less robust to random node attacks than the case in which the node attacks only happen to only one node set. The results shown in Figs. 2-4 also show that increasing the degree of an ER two-mode network can increase it robustness.
D. TESTING ON ER TWO-MODE NETWORKS WITH
The above subsection has proved the correctness of the proposed theory for assessing the robustness of ER twomode networks to random node attacks. Note that realworld networks usually suffer from intentional attacks. In this subsection, we will test our proposed theory under the case of intentional attacks. Specifically, we study the case where α = 1.
Figs. 2-7 summarize the results on the three Classes of networks subject to intentional node attacks. For each class of networks, when the intentional node attacks happen to V 1 , our proposed theory leads to the following robustness calculation equations P By substituting the expression of P 1 (k) into that of variable ϕ we have ϕ =
For each class of networks, when the intentional node attacks happen to V 2 , our proposed theory leads to the following robustness calculation equations
where the variable ϕ is calculated as ϕ = ln p n 1 r + 1. For each class of networks, when the intentional node attacks happen to both V 1 and V 2 , our proposed theory leads to the following robustness calculation equations As can be seen from Figs. 5-7 that the turning points of p generally have larger values than those recorded in the figures shown in last subsection. This phenomenon indicates that ER two-mode networks are less robust to intentional attacks. The above experiments also indicate that increasing the degree of an ER two-mode network can increase its robustness to intentional attacks. 
E. MORE DISCUSSION
It can be seen from Figs. 5-7 that there are small deviations between the theoretical and simulation results. Nevertheless, these kinds of deviations are acceptable and make sense. Two main reasons are accountable for the deviations. On the one hand, the theoretical calculations rely on the probability distributions of the nodes' degrees. As indicated by Property 1 that an ER two-mode network exactly follows Poisson degree distributions only when the network size is infinite. However, in the simulations the size of a tested network is only with a magnitude of 10 5 . Therefore, the simulation results deviate from the theoretical ones. On the other hand, in order to make sure that each node has exactly the probability as given by Eq. 3 to be removed, the simulations should be carried out for an infinite number of times. For practical computing reasons, we only carry out simulations for 500 times. As a consequence, the deviations can be decreased with the increase of the simulations numbers.
In summary, the above experiments on ER two-mode networks demonstrate the correctness of our proposed theory for the robustness assessment of two-mode networks to intentional node attacks. In the experiments, SF two-mode networks are not tested. The main reason is that generating two-mode networks with power law distributions is challenging [43] - [45] . This research direction still need efforts.
When investigating the robustness of two-mode networks to intentional node attacks, we only investigate the case for α = 1. The main reason is that our proposed theory can have simplified mathematical forms when α = 1 and when ER two-mode networks are considered. In the case of α = 1, equations given in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 do not have analytical solutions. In that case, one has to seek for the numerical solutions. However, the numerical solutions are not that easy to work out and the situation may become more severe if SF two-mode networks are considered.
VI. CONCLUSION
A complex system in real-world usually contains a lot of functional units. The units of a complex systems normally interact with one another. If one unit is failed because of system malfunction or external attacks, other units which rely on the failed unit will lose their functionalities and will fail. Those failed units will further affect other units in the system. Eventually, many units would fail due to the failure of one unit. The failures of many units can make the whole system lose its functionality. It is therefore important to pre-assess the stabilities of complex systems in the case of random units failures or intentional attacks.
In order to pre-assess the stabilities of complex systems, one effective method is to model a complex system as a complex network and then apply network theories to calculate the network robustness and use the network robustness as a metric for the stability assessment of the original complex system. Many network theories now have been proposed by researchers to calculate the robustness of complex networks. Because real-world complex systems usually interact with one another, in order to capture the stability properties of these systems, the multilayer network modelling has come out. In the literature, a lot of methods have been proposed to investigate the robustness of multilayer networks.
It should be pointed out that there are some real-world complex systems which cannot be modelled as multilayer networks but two-mode networks. Investigating the robustness of two-mode networks is important to assess the stabilities of the corresponding complex systems. While existing methods can hardly be applied to investigate the robustness of twomode networks, this paper presented a novel network theory for the robustness calculation of a given two-mode network. The presented theory can calculate the robustness of a given two-mode network either under random node attacks or under intentional node attacks. In order to validate the effectiveness of the proposed theory, simulations on computer-generated two-mode networks have been done. The simulations demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed theory.
